En Amérique du Nord, l'économie verte est à la croisée des chemins : favorisera-t-elle, à l'échelle de l'ensemble de l'économie, une nouvelle vague d'innovation, de création d'emplois et de croissance verte, ou les secteurs verts resteront-ils une simple niche à l'intérieur d'une économie « brune » ? Cela dépendra pour beaucoup de ce qui remplacera le « vide politique » que l'on observe depuis la mise en place de politiques de relance vertes au moment de la Grande Récession. Actuellement, trois éléments sont nuisibles sur ce plan : des subventions préjudiciables à l'environnement, des mesures incitatives axées sur le marché inadéquates et un soutien public insuffisant de la R et D privée. Dans cet article, nous expliquons qu'une véritable stratégie de croissance verte nécessite l'élimination progressive et la rationalisation des subventions, la mise en place d'instruments axés sur le marché efficaces et une répartition des revenus ainsi obtenus qui permettra de faire croître l'innovation verte.
Introduction
A green economy results in ''improved human wellbeing and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities,'' and thus ''in a green economy, growth in income and employment should be driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services. These investments need to be catalysed and supported by targeted public expenditure, policy reforms and regulation changes'' (UNEP 2011, 16) .
Today, the nascent green economy in North America is at a crucial crossroads: Will ''green'' sectors remain a small niche within an overall ''brown'' economy, or will the green economy foster a new wave of sustainable industrial innovation, R&D, and employment that ultimately replaces the brown economy? As this paper outlines, which path the green economy in North America takes will depend crucially on the policy choices made in the coming years and decades. To determine these choices, it is important to understand the state of the major green sectors in North America, the current policy climate for their development, and the challenges and obstacles to sustaining green growth. After briefly reviewing these trends, the paper proposes a three-step strategy for building a green economy in North America. Such a strategy may also have an important role in fostering economy-wide productivity growth and expansion that could also reduce the growing problem of wealth inequality in North America (Barbier 2015, ch. 9 ).
Recession of 2008 to 2010, the major global economies devoted nearly 16 percent of their total fiscal stimulus to ''green investments,'' such as low-carbon energy, energy efficiency, pollution abatement and materials recycling, natural-resources conservation and environmental compliance, and other green sectors (see Appendix). The United States allocated 12 percent, Canada nearly 9 percent, and Mexico almost 10 percent. Even before the recession, nascent green sectors were emerging in North America. Pew Charitable Trusts (2009) found that, between 1998 and 2007, jobs in the clean-energy sector grew more quickly than overall job growth in the United States and by 2007 accounted for over 770,000 jobs, or approximately 0.5 percent of employment in that country. 1 In Canada, between 2007 and 2009, clean-technology investments boomed by 47 percent, and by 2010 this sector employed 45,000 people (Sustainable Prosperity 2012).
Today, five key sectors are considered part of the burgeoning North American green economy (see US Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.):
e energy from renewable resources, e energy efficiency, e pollution abatement and materials recycling, e natural-resources conservation and ecological restoration, and e environmental compliance, education, training, and public awareness.
Estimates suggest that green sectors in the United States employ more than three million workers (around 3 percent of US employment), produce around 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and have exceeded economy-wide GDP growth every year since 2000 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.; Environmental Business International 2013). In 2013, there were over 730,000 environmental professionals in Canada, just over 4 percent of the labour force (ECO Canada 2013). The number of jobs in this area has grown tenfold since 1993 and nearly tripled in the past ten years; in comparison, total Canadian employment from 2003 to 2013 grew by only 13 percent (ECO Canada 2013).
Policy Challenges and Obstacles
However, the expansion of the green economy in North America could remain confined to a few niche sectors rather than lead to sustained, economy-wide green growth. Key difficulties include outdated utility business models, inadequate transmission infrastructure for renewables, and complications caused by decreasing energy and resource prices (Before It's News 2014). The clean-technology industry in Canada is also underfunded by venture capitalism and public research and development (R&D) financing (Sustainable Prosperity 2012).
The US and Canadian economies may also be getting ''browner.'' A ranking of 19 major economies based on an ''international carbon competitiveness'' index found that, in 2008, Canada was ranked 6th, and the United States 9th (Vivid Economics 2013). But by 2010, the US had fallen to 11th and Canada to 8th place among the same 19 countries. Since 1995, the other countries (except Australia) have increased low-carbon competitiveness, whereas the US index score has declined and Canada's has not changed.
One major problem facing the green economy in North America is the ''policy void'' since the green stimulus policies enacted during the Great Recession. Because there has been insufficient policy follow-up, the green stimulus in North America was largely a shortterm boost to green sectors, not to mention the overall economy. This is due to three principal reasons (Barbier 2010b) .
First, over 60 percent of the global green stimulus was devoted to energy efficiency (see Appendix), much of which was aimed at boosting short-term employment. In the United States and Canada, around half of green-stimulus spending was on energy efficiency, and Mexico's entire green stimulus went to energy efficiency. Nearly all of Canada's low-carbon power investments (US$1.1 billion) went into carbon capture and storage (US$920 million; all subsequent amounts are in US dollars).
Second, North American economies spent less on green stimulus during the Great Recession compared to other economies, notably those in Asia (see Appendix). Over the 2008-2009 period, the three North American economies enacted just over $121 billion in green stimulus, with the US accounting for the bulk ($118 billion), followed by Canada ($2.8 billion) and then Mexico ($800 million). In contrast, Asian and Pacific economies allocated $342 billion. China alone accounted for $201 billion, South Korea $60 billion, and Japan over $43 billion.
Finally, major market disincentives to long-term development of the green economy in the form of environmentally harmful subsidies, the absence of pollution taxes and other market-based incentives, and the lack of public investments to support private green R&D remain a fundamental obstacle to long-term development of the green economy. These market disincentives also appear to be sustained by a combination of institutional inertia and vested political interests (Barbier 2015, ch. 6 ).
The last obstacle-the lack of complementary and effective public policies and investments-remains the fundamental hindrance to the emergence of a green economy in North America. Unless a greater effort is made to remove the major market disincentives to longterm development of the green economy, such as harmful subsidies, inadequate pollution taxes, and other market-based incentives, and to reverse the lack of public support of private green R&D, the green economy ''boom'' in North America may turn out to be a ''bust.''
Environmentally Harmful Subsidies
The persistence of fossil-fuel subsidies is one example of environmentally harmful subsidies that are slowing the development of the green economy in North America. They have the triple-whammy effect of creating economic inefficiencies in production, distorting market prices to make fossil fuels artificially cheap relative to clean energy sources, and increasing environmental damages and health effects from pollution. A review of global estimates of fossil-fuel subsidies found that they remain extensive in North America (see Table 1 ).
However, the persistence of fossil-fuel subsidies and other environmentally damaging subsidies, such as in agriculture, water use, and transport, creates another problem for the North American economy. Such subsidies provide the rationale for implementing environmentally motivated subsidies as the main policy for fostering the green economy: first, to counter the price advantage that environmentally harmful subsidies give to the brown economy, and second, to promote the expansion of, and employment in, the emerging sectors of the green economy.
As indicated in Table 2 , the number of environmentally motivated subsidies used in Canada and the United States is already large. Some of these subsidies could be relatively minor in their impact, and others may be necessary. However, it is also clear from the table that every major green sector in North America has already benefited from some form of major subsidy. Employing subsidies to temporarily foster the expansion of nascent green sectors and industries may seem like a reasonable policy. Unfortunately, as the persistence of environmentally harmful subsidies in North America illustrates, once any subsidy is implemented, it becomes difficult to remove and thus often remains in place indefinitely.
The growing and widespread use of environmentally motivated subsidies in North America may in turn become an obstacle to green economic development over the long term. Just like any other subsidy, they can lead to inefficiencies, lack of competitiveness, and overuse. They may also, perversely, cause some environmental damages. For example, biofuel subsidies in the United States have been directly related to increased nitrate runoff, and energy-efficient subsidies across North America, especially to households or for technology changes in transport, have sometimes led to increased energy use (Barbier and Markandya 2012, 113-18) . In other cases, subsidies might increase adoption rates of a green good or service but without producing all the desired environmental and green development impacts. For example, a study of the German feed-in-tariff found that the subsidy did lead to a massive growth in electricity production from renewables; however, the policy did not reduce greenhouse-gas emissions substantially, as renewable expansion led to too little abatement from other mitigation opportunities such as fuel switching, nor was there a significant boost to clean-energy innovation (Böhringer, Cuntz Harhoff, and Asane Otoo 2014). The equivalent subsidy used widely across North America-the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)-could be producing similar outcomes.
To summarize, phasing out environmentally harmful subsidies, such as those for fossil fuels, is an important first step in building a green economy. However, the growing and widespread reliance of green sectors on environmentally motivated subsidies is worrisome. This leads to the following policy proposal:
The first step in building a green economy will require phasing out environmentally harmful subsidies, such as those for fossil fuels; however, the increasing reliance of the green economy on environmentally motivated subsidies is not helpful and may even be counter-productive to its longterm development, and many of these subsidies could be rationalized or phased out. 
Market-based Incentives
In addition to removing subsidies that may hinder the development of the green economy, other market-based incentives may be important. These include taxes and charges for environmental services, tradable permit schemes, payments for environmental services (PES), and voluntary mechanisms. A variety of environmental taxes and charges are currently employed in North America, including emissions charges, product charges (including deposit/ refund schemes for recycling), and user fees for environmental services, natural-resource use or waste disposal (Barbier and Markandya, Table 6 .1). However, most of these incentives are currently set at low rates or are subject to many exemptions, so they do not reduce environmental damages significantly or provide sufficient incentives for economy-wide green investments. In addition, many taxes and charges are designed principally for raising revenues rather than for generating incentive effects.
The benefits to the North American economy of implementing taxes more effectively and of charges and other environmental market-based incentives could be substantial. For example, as the estimates in Table 1 indicate, the annual cost of inefficient pricing of fossil fuels through subsidies, tax breaks, and various environmental costs in Canada is over $26 billion. In Mexico, the amount is nearly $28 billion, and in the United States over $500 billion. As Table 1 suggests, once fossil-fuel subsidies are removed, the additional benefits of instigating marketbased incentives to eliminate the remaining market failures from inefficient pricing would amount to at least $20 billion annually for Canada, $10 billion for Mexico, and $490 billion each year for the United States.
Similar inefficient pricing exists in markets for key goods and services throughout the North American economy, including agriculture, water supply and use, natural resources, and transport. To take one exampleinefficient water pricing-this problem may best be tackled by a variety of market-based incentives, such as establishing water markets, tradable permit schemes, taxes and charges for water use and pollution, and payments for environmental services. Unlike control of air pollution in North America, the use of charges, taxes, and tradable permits to reduce water pollution has been limited. Greater efforts need to be made in developing and implementing water-pollution charges, including permit fees, discharge levies, and fines, as a means of discouraging excessive effluent discharges from point and non-point sources. The use of water-quality trading schemes is occurring in some river basins in Canada and the United States, but the geographic coverage remains small (Horan and Shortle 2011) .
Payments for environmental services (PES) are also emerging across North America, but they are still underutilized. PES are agreements whereby a user or beneficiary of an environmental service provides payments to individuals or communities whose management decisions To summarize, market-based incentives could be expanded and implemented more effectively to reduce inefficient pricing in several key markets for goods and services in the North American economy. Such a policy strategy would not only generate significant health and environmental benefits but also boost existing green sectors and stimulate more economy-wide green growth. This leads to the following policy proposal:
The second step in building a green economy is to expand the use of, and to implement more effectively, a wide range of market-based incentives, such as taxes, charges, and payments for environmental services, tradable permit schemes, and voluntary mechanisms, to generate environmental and health benefits, boost existing green sectors, and stimulate economy-wide green growth.
Green Innovation and Investment
An important impetus for rapid economy-wide innovation is ''technology spillovers,'' which occur when the inventions, designs, and technologies resulting from the research and development (R&D) activities by one firm or industry spread relatively cheaply and quickly to other firms and industries. However, such technology spillovers also undermine the incentives for a private firm or industry to invest in R&D activities. The private investor bears the full costs of financing R&D and may improve its own technologies and products as a result, but the investor receives no returns from the subsequent spread of these innovations throughout the economy. The consequence is that private firms and industries routinely under-invest in R&D, and the result is less economy-wide innovation overall.
Under-investment in R&D may be a serious obstacle to the development of the green economy in North America. Moreover, overcoming this disincentive cannot be achieved solely through the use of market-based incentives to correct inefficient pricing but requires the simultaneous implementation of ''technology-push policies,'' such as R&D subsidies, public investments, protecting intellectual property, and other initiatives (Goulder 2004) . Market-based incentives may reduce pricing distortions that put green goods and services at a competitive advantage. However, only technology-push policies directly address the tendency of firms and industries to under-invest in green R&D.
Goulder (2004) finds that reducing the costs of lowcarbon energy adoption in the United States stems both from the boost to private sector R&D and from learningby-doing as firms gain familiarity with new low-carbon technologies, products, and processes. He identifies both a set of technology-push policies and a set of directemissions policies that consistently induce additional technological change by supporting private R&D and learning-by-doing (see Table 3 ). However, Goulder also finds that the direct emissions policies on their own cannot induce sufficient private-sector investment in innovations and learning-by-doing; rather, there needs to be complementary technology-push policies implemented as well.
Studies for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions in the United States and other OECD economies show that combining the two types of policies substantially lowers the costs of meeting targets compared to relying solely on a technology-push approach (Blesl et al. 2010; Fischer and Newell 2008; Pew Charitable Trusts 2009; Popp 2010) . The optimal portfolio of policies generally includes some form of subsidies and other public support for technology R&D and learning along with carbon pricing and other direct-emissions policies. Such an outcome is likely to extend to other sectors of the green economy, especially when spillovers of knowledge make it difficult for private investors in R&D to reap the full social benefits of their innovations.
However, public support and investments may also be critical for other bottlenecks to green growth in North America. One obstacle already identified is inadequate transmission infrastructure for renewables, which can be overcome only through public investments to design and construct a ''smart'' electrical-grid transmission system that can integrate diffuse and conventional sources of supply. Another is the development of green-growth policies in urban areas that combine municipal planning and transport policies to foster more sustainable cities. Finally, public investment in mass transit systems, both within urban areas and on major routes connecting cities, has been a long-neglected aspect of public infrastructure development throughout North America. To summarize, the lack of public support for private green R&D and insufficient public investments to overcome other obstacles to green growth are serious impediments that need to be addressed. In the current fiscal climate in North America, it has proven difficult to raise additional funds for such public investments. In fact, as a result of the 2013 US federal budget sequestration (automatic spending cuts), federal grants and loans in support of renewable energy research, development, and commercialization projects have already been curtailed severely (Renewable Energy World n.d.).
However, the phasing out of environmentally harmful subsidies, the rationalization or phasing out of many environmentally motivated subsidies, and the use of various market-based incentives should save or generate substantial sums of money annually to finance the required public investments to support green growth. For example, based on the estimates for fossil-fuel subsidies in Table 1 , the phasing out of just these subsidies would free up at least $3 billion annually in Canada, $16 billion in Mexico, and $9 billion in the United States, which could then be earmarked for a Green Economy Innovation and Investment Fund (GEIIF) to finance the necessary public support for private-sector green R&D and investments. This leads to the following policy proposal:
The final step in building a green economy is to allocate the revenues raised or generated from the phasing out of environmentally harmful subsidies, the rationalization or phasing out of many environmentally motivated subsidies, and the use of various market-based incentives to establish a Green Economy Innovation and Investment Fund (GEIIF), the purpose of which is to finance the necessary public support for private-sector green R&D and investments, as well as other public infrastructure and programs necessary for green growth.
Final Remarks
Ultimately, whether green sectors remain just one small niche within an overall brown economy, or green growth ushers in a new wave of industrial innovation, R&D, and employment, requires ending the current ''policy void'' that has emerged in North America since the Great Recession. As long as this void persists, harmful subsidies, inadequate pollution taxes and other marketbased incentives, and the dwindling public support of private green R&D and investments will continue to hinder economy-wide green development. Another concern is that green sectors are becoming overly reliant on environmentally motivated subsidies, which could be detrimental to green growth over the long run. We are in danger of developing a highly subsidized North American economy rather than a greener one.
The three policy steps proposed in this paper aim to foster a more economy-wide effort at fostering green growth. Building on the emerging green sectors in North America, the objective of these policies is to develop and enhance the potential of these sectors to lead the entire economy onto a greener and more sustainable growth path. All three policies are essential to an integrated strategy, and as outlined and summarized in Figure 1 , they are also interdependent: step one involves phasing out key subsidies, not only because this policy is relatively straightforward to implement but also because determining which additional market-based incentives to employ requires first assessing the environmental and economic consequences of subsidy removal. This pricing policy should be step two in the strategy. Finally, establishing a Green Economy Innovation and Investment Fund (GEIIF) to finance the necessary public support for private-sector green R&D and investments should be the subsequent policy, because the Fund's financing should come from any revenues saved from subsidy removal or generated from market-based incentives.
Clearly, important obstacles exist to this policy strategy, especially the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies and the expansion of market-based incentives. In particular, vested political interests and institutional inertia in North America are significant deterrents to these critical steps (Barbier 2015, ch. 6 ). On the other hand, these policies are crucial to fostering a new phase of economy-wide productivity growth and expansion that could also reduce wealth inequality in North America (Barbier 2015, ch. 9) .
The proposed policy strategy suggests some important areas for future research on the green economy and innovation in North America. There should be further research on the lessons learned from the experience with the North American green stimulus packages, in terms of transitioning to a green economy and of creating lasting green jobs and industries. In addition, there needs to be more research on specific cases across North America of the successful removal of environmentally harmful subsidies, as well as the implementation of specific market-based incentives for reducing environmental damages, to help inform and improve implementation of these two policies. There must also be more analysis of the economic impacts of environmentally motivated subsidies, including some of their long-term impacts on competitiveness and efficiency and the role of ''sunset clauses'' to restrict the duration of such subsidies. Finally, more research is required on the role and range of public subsidies to support private R&D investments in green innovation.
Note
It is common to refer to two of these areas, low carbon power (LC) and energy efficiency (EE), as comprising collectively the clean energy sector of an economy, although there is an ongoing debate about whether nuclear power should be included in this sector (Barbier 2010a; Pew Charitable Trusts 2009) .
Green stimulus in the above three areas is measured in terms of the additional fiscal commitments made by national governments during the 2008-2009 recession in the form of spending plans or tax breaks. Additional investments resulting from regulatory mandates, such as renewable energy obligations, vehicle fuel-use standards, or energy-efficiency requirements, are usually not included.
Appendix Table A .1 summarizes the global green stimulus enacted by governments from September 2008 through December 2009. Appendix Table A .2 provides a further breakdown of the major green stimulus packages enacted during the recession, by region and country. 
